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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN
JAMES D. GHIARDI*
I. THEORY AND NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Introduction
Over 122 years ago the Wisconsin court decided that a
plaintiff under the proper circumstances was entitled to re-
cover exemplary or punitive damages.' Since the rule was first
adopted it has been held that, in order to warrant the assess-
ment of punitive damages, it must appear that the wrong was
inflicted "under circumstances of aggravation, insult, or cru-
elty, with vindictiveness and malice."' 2 All damages in excess
of actual damages are punitive in character.3 The wisdom of
the rule of punitive damages was questioned in the early cases
and by Chief Justice Ryan in Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway,4 but it was concluded that the policy was too well
established to be overturned by judicial decision.
The principal attack upon the rule of exemplary damages
related to its constitutionality. In Brown v. Swineford,5 the
defendant was charged with assault and battery, and prior to
the civil action the defendant had been subjected to criminal
prosecution and fined. Defendant claimed that the allowance
of punitive damages placed the defendant in double jeopardy.
The court held that the constitutional objection was not well
taken since the constitutional provision against double jeop-
ardy forbade merely two criminal prosecutions. Exemplary
damages are imposed as punishment for a private tort - not
for a public crime - and are awarded to the victim, not the
public.'
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Grateful acknowledgment
is made for the invaluable research assistance of Thomas R. Schrimpf, Callahan
Scholar and senior student at Marquette University Law School.
Editor's Note: This article is an updated version of the chapter on Exemplary or
Punitive Damages in Professor Ghiardi's book, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN
(Callahan 1964).
1. McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854).
2. Christensen v. Schwartz, 198 Wis. 222, 227, 223 N.W. 839, 840 (1929).
3. Oconto County v. Union Mfg. Co., 190 Wis. 44, 208 N.W. 989 (1926).
4. 42 Wis. 654 (1877).
5. 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
6. See T. Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, Defense Research In-
stitute Monograph No. 15, The Case Against Punitive Damages (August 1969).
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Recent constituional attacks on libel and slander law have
substantially altered the allowance of punitive damages in libel
cases involving matters of public interest. In New York Times
v. Sullivan,7 the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of press place limitations
upon state libel law. The threat of extensive punitive awards
may have a chilling effect on those first amendment rights in
certain cases involving the public media. Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court in a series of cases, has developed specific stan-
dards to be applied in libel and slander cases involving publish-
ers and broadcasters.8
B. Availability of Punitive Damages
The rule is clear that punitive damages will be awarded
only where the harm was inflicted "under circumstances of
aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness or malice,"9
or where the defendant acted in wanton, wilful or reckless dis-
regard of the plaintiff's rights.'" In general, a tort must be ac-
companied by actual ill will or malevolence toward the plaintiff
in order to warrant an award of punitive damages. With respect
to intentional torts, the requirement of actual malice means a
requirement of an intent over and above the wrongful intent
necessary to sustain the action:
Any exact and precise definition of the technical term in
the law of the "malice" that must be shown in order that
there may be a basis for punitory damages in addition to
compensatory damages for a breach of some duty by a defen-
dant when such is the proper subject of an action in tort, is
hard to find and still harder to frame. It is evident, however,
from all the authorities that in any particular case, not in and
of itself a malicious action, in order that punitory damages
may be assessed something must be shown over and above
the mere breach of duty for which compensatory damages can
be given. That is, a showing of a bad intent deserving punish-
ment, or something in the nature of special ill will towards
the person injured, or a wanton, deliberate disregard of the
particular duty then being breached, or that which resembles
gross as distinguished from ordinary negligence."
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. See discussion of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Calero v. Del
Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975), at 755-57 infra.
9. McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854).
10. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
11. Meshane v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 387, 222 N.W. 320, 322 (1928).
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Obviously, since a malicious intent is necessary, punitive
damages cannot be awarded in the case of ordinary negli-
gence. 2 Further, the intent must be premeditated as distin-
guished from a mere recent surge of passion,' 3 but the ill will
need not have been long-harbored."
The malice, or ill will toward plaintiff, necessary to support
punitive damages, must be actual in the sense that it is ex-
press, as distinguished from constructive or implied in law.
This is best illustrated by cases involving libel or slander. It
might be supposed from this that exemplary damages could be
awarded in any case where libel or slander would lie. The mal-
ice necessary to support such actions, however, is "implied" or
"conclusively presumed" from the falsity of the defamatory
words and the lack of proper motive for their publication. 5
Such malice will not support exemplary damages. In order to
justify the giving of such damages it must be shown that the
defendant, in committing the tort, had "express malice" which
is a statement motivated by ill will, spite, envy, revenge, or
other corrupt motives." The recent case of Calero v. Del Chem-
ical Corp. "1 reiterated the rule that in order to recover damages
in an ordinary private libel action, the plaintiff must show
express malice by a preponderance of the evidence.
The rule that is applied to cases of libel and slander is said
not to apply to cases of malicious prosecution since in the latter
action actual malice is a necessary ingredient of the cause of
action. It would appear that exemplary damages may be im-
posed in any case where malicious prosecution will lie. '
C. When Punitive Damages Are Not Appropriate
Punitive damages are not appropriate in breach of contract
actions, even if the breach is willful." However, in Mid-
12. Id.
13. Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574 (1872).
14. Lowe v. Ring, 123 Wis. 107, 101 N.W. 381 (1904); Nichols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis.
549, 69 N.W. 342 (1896).
15. Delaney v. Keatel, 81 Wis. 353, 51 N.W. 559 (1892); Brueshaber v. Herting, 78
Wis. 498, 47 N.W. 725 (1891).
16. Grace v. McArthur, 76 Wis. 641, 45 N.W. 518 (1890); Eviston v. Cramer, 57
Wis. 570, 15 N.W. 760 (1883). See also Wis. J.I.-CMnvL No. 2520.
17. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1975).
18. Fuchs v. Kupper, 22 Wis. 2d 107, 125 N.W.2d 360 (1963).
19. Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 177 N.W.2d 899 (1970); White
v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 155 N.W.2d 74 (1967).
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Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka" the court considered
whether punitive damages should be allowed for fraud or deceit
in the inducement of a contract. Prior to the instant case the
only contract cases in which the court had allowed punitive
damages for fraud in the inducement to contract had been
actions for breach of promise to marry.21 Mid-Continent in-
volved alleged fraud in inducing the purchase of a display
freezer. The court after questioning the propriety of allowing
punitive damages for fraud in the inducement of a contract,
concluded:
We do not hold that fraud or deceit in the inducement of a
contract can never be the basis for an award of punitive dam-
ages. We do hold that the facts of this case in the inducement
to enter the contract do not justify a finding of malice, vindic-
tiveness or wanton disregard necessary to justify the imposi-
tion of punitive damages.Y
In a recent decision the Wisconsin Supreme Court left open the
question whether punitive damages were recoverable in a case
involving an intentional interference with contractual rights.2
The United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions
has substantially limited the award of punitive damages in
certain defamation actions. In cases involving publishers and
broadcasters as defendants there must be a finding by "clear
and convincing" evidence of both express malice, that is "ill
will, envy, spite, revenge," and actual malice, knowledge that
a statement was false or published with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not, to support an award of punitive
damages.24 The rule is motivated by a concern that "jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates
the danger of media self-censorship" 25 which would be an intol-
erable infringement of the constitutionally-guaranteed free-
doms of speech and press. The recent case of Polzin v. Helm-
brect26 has stated the rule as follows:
20. 47 Wis. 2d 739, 178 N.W.2d 28 (1970).
21. Id. at 745, 178 N.W.2d at 31.
22. Id. at 748, 178 N.W.2d at 33. See also D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303,
222 N.W.2d 671 (1974).
23. Goldman v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Wis. 2d 334, 126 N.W.2d 1 (1964).
24. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350.
26. 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972).
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It should finally be noted that in a case such as this where
the New York Times standards apply and where punitive
damages are sought there must be a finding of both express
and actual malice to support an award of punitive damages:
"Express malice" to meet criteria for awarding punitive dam-
ages and "actual malice" to meet the constitutional require-
ments for liability at all.Y
In ordinary private libel actions involving neither matters
of public interest, the media, nor public figures, the plaintiff
may recover punitive damages upon a showing of express mal-
ice by a preponderance of the evidence.2s
D. When Actual Malice Is Not Necessary
Exceptions to the rule that actual malice is necessary to
sustain an award of punitive damages have arisen. The first of
these exceptions is the case where the defendant, while perhaps
not actuated by ill will toward the plaintiff, has nevertheless
acted with wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
In Kink v. Combs, 29 a case involving a sexual assault, the plain-
tiff was awarded a substantial amount of punitive damages. On
appeal the defendant claimed that punitive damages were in-
appropriate because his acts were not activated by malice or
vindictiveness. The court held that malice or vindictiveness
was not the sine qua non of punitive damages. The court
stated: "For the award of punitive damages it is sufficient that
there be a showing of wanton, wilful, or reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights."3 However, where no express malice is
shown the character of the offense must have the outrageous-
ness associated with serious crime.31
The law in Wisconsin is somewhat uncertain as to whether
conduct formerly characterized as gross negligence can be
made the basis of a verdict for exemplary damages. Early Wis-
consin cases allowed punitive damages for conduct amounting
to gross negligence. In Meibus v. Dodge32 the plaintiff was at-
tacked and bitten by a vicious dog belonging to the defendant.
27. Id. at 588, 196 N.W.2d at 691.
28. Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975); Wis. J.I. -
CIVIL No. 2520.
29. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
30. Id. at 79, 135 N.W.2d at 797.
31. Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 177 N.W.2d 899 (1970); Jones
v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
32. 38 Wis. 300 (1875).
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It was alleged and proved that the defendant knew of the vi-
cious propensities of the dog and negligently permitted him to
run at large. It was held that the defendant was guilty of wan-
ton and reckless conduct, amounting to malice and justifying
exemplary damages. 3
However, in Bielski v. Schulze 4 the court abolished the
doctrine of gross negligence and apparently limited punitive
damage awards to intentional torts. The court stated:
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away with
the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases. But puni-
tive damages are given, not to compensate the plaintiff for his
injury but to punish and deter the tortfeasor, and were ac-
quired by gross negligence as accountrements of intentional
torts. Wilful and intentional torts, of course, still exist, but
should not be confused with negligence. See sec. 481, p. 1260,
Restatement, 2 Torts. The protection of the public from such
conduct or from reckless, wanton, or wilful conduct is best
served by the criminal laws of the state.3 1
Notwithstanding the court's statement it is likely that punitive
damages can be recovered in cases where the defendant's con-
duct amounts to what was formerly categorized as gross negli-
gence; that is where defendant has acted in wanton, wilful, or
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
In Kink v. Combs3 7 the court rejected the rationale that
reckless, wanton or wilful conduct was best dealt with by the
Criminal Code. Without mentioning Bielski the court stated:
Suffice it to say that whatever shortcomings the award of
punitive damages may have, nevertheless, it must be remem-
bered that it has the effect of bringing to punishment types
of conduct that though oppressive and hurtful to the individ-
ual almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecu-
tor."
33. See also Theby v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 197 Wis. 601, 222 N.W. 826
(1929); Meshane v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 222 N.W. 320 (1928); Rueping v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 Wis. 625, 93 N.W. 843 (1903); Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis.
1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
34. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
35. Id. at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
36. See Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs,
49 MARQ. L. Rv. 369 (1965).
37. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
38. Id. at 80, 135 N.W.2d at 798.
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Although Kink v. Combs and subsequent cases following its
rule involved intentional torts, the character of the conduct
supporting punitive damages is similar to that form formally
called gross negligence. While Bielski abolished the doctrine of
gross negligence as a legal doctrine, in fact wanton, wilful or
reckless conduct still exists. If this conduct is labeled negligent,
rather than intentional, damages could still be awarded.
As of this writing there has not been a post-Bielski Wiscon-
sin case involving an award of punitive damages in a negligence
action alleging wanton or reckless conduct. The United States
District Court, in Drake v. Wham-o Manufacturing Co.," con-
sidered plaintiff's complaint in a product liability case alleging
a wanton disregard for the safety and well being of the plain-
tiff's deceased husband, and demanding punitive damages.
The defendants argued that punitive damages were only avail-
able for intentional torts and, therefore, plaintiff failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court
construing Wisconsin law stated that Wisconsin law would ar-
guably allow punitive damages in a products liability case
where there is a showing of wanton, wilful, or reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights.
A second exception to the rule requiring actual malice is
found in a parent's action for the seduction of his daughter.
Klopfer v. Bromme,40 was an action by plaintiff for the de-
bauching of his daughter and it was assumed that it was proper
to award punitive damages although the defendant did not
entertain ill-will toward the plaintiff. This was followed in
Luther v. Shaw4 where the court pointed out that the fact that
the debauched daughter had been allowed punitive damages
did not prevent or reduce the amount to be recovered by the
father. It has been suggested that these cases can be disposed
of under the first exception as indicating a wanton disregard of
the rights of the parent by the defendant."
E. Proof of Malice
The finding of "malice" justifies an award of punitive dam-
ages. Malice is a subjective state of mind, evinced only by overt
39. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
40. 26 Wis. 373 (1870).
41. 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914).
42. See Wickhem, The Rule of Exemplary Damages in Wisconsin, 2 Wi. L. Rv.
129 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Wickhem].
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acts, such as words or conduct. From such acts the malicious
intent of the defendant may be inferred." In Spear v. Sweeney44
the court stated that words spoken before and after the particu-
lar assault were admissible to prove express malice. Where the
defendant's conduct is outrageous, wanton or in reckless disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights proof of malicious intent is not
necessary; the character of the act is a sufficient basis for an
award of punitive damages.45 In a recent case, Roach v.
Keane,4" the court allowed punitive damages in a cause of ac-
tion for alienation of affection and criminal conversation47 al-
though the record contained no evidence that the defendant
was an insensitive homewrecker or had any malicious inten-
tions. If the words or conduct are unequivocal they are compe-
tent to prove express malice. If they are equivocal then their
meaning is for the jury.
F. Malice and Compensatory Damages
The aggravated conduct of the defendant, exposing the
plaintiff to humiliation, disgrace, insult or indignity which
causes mental suffering, may be the basis for compensatory
damages no matter what the motive of the defendant may be,
and such conduct may also be taken by the jury to evince
malice on the part of the defendant and to justify the giving of
punitive damages. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wilson v.
Young" and Gatzow v. Buening,49 indicated that malice had no
effect on compensatory damages either physical or mental.
This should not give rise to confusion, for although exem-
plary damages are defined as an award over and above the
amount necessary to compensate for injuries sustained, this
means that compensation does not enter the field of exemplary
damage. The fact that exemplary damages are awarded does
not preclude plaintiff from having full damages for mental suf-
fering, humiliation and disgrace occasioned by the aggravated
43. See Wis. J.I. - CIVIL No. 1707.
44. 88 Wis. 545, 60 N.W. 1060 (1894).
45. See Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965) (sexual assault);
Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900) (denial of the use of a hearse);
Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300 (1875) (allowing a vicious dog to run loose).
46. 73 Wis. 2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976).
47. Actions for alienation of affection and criminal conversation are now barred by
Wis. STAT. § 248.01 (1973).
48. 31 Wis. 574 (1872).
49. 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
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character of the defendant's acts. In assessing compensatory
damages it is the character of the act and not the motive that
is important.
Malice as a mental state is frequently evidenced by acts and
conduct that have a natural tendency to produce mental suffer-
ing, but in assessing exemplary damages the character of these
acts is only important insofar as it indicates objectively that
the defendant was malicious. In the case of compensatory dam-
ages for mental suffering the motive of the defendant is of no
consequence; mere motive cannot inflict mental suffering, it
can be inflicted only by acts or conduct. The character of the
act and its tendency to produce mental suffering is considered.
This reasoning was important in the case of Craker v. Chicago
& Northwestern Railway 0 where the defendant's agent com-
mitted a battery on the plaintiff while she was a passenger on
the defendant's train. The defendant was not held liable for
punitive damages for although the acts were within the scope
of the agent's employment, the principal did not participate in
the agent's motive. On the other hand the mental suffering,
vexation and anxiety suffered by the plaintiff were compensa-
ble in damages and liability would attach because of the aggra-
vated nature of the acts.
G. Effect of Plaintiff's Provocative Conduct
The question arises as to whether the plaintiff's provocative
conduct will prevent the recovery of punitive damages or re-
duce the amount of recovery or both. Generally, the rule is that
the provocative conduct of the plaintiff will not reduce the
amount of, nor prevent the recovery of compensatory damages,
unless it amounts to self-defense or consent.-'
It has been said by some courts that the malicious acts of
the plaintiff may be weighed against the malicious acts of the
defendant and exemplary damages reduced or denied accord-
ing to the findings of the jury.5" For a time it appeared that this
was the Wisconsin rule. In Brown v. Swineford, 3 the court
relied on two prior Wisconsin decisions for the rule "that pro-
vocation may go to exclude exemplary damages. In such a case,
50. 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
51. Prindle v. Haight, 83 Wis. 50, 52 N.W. 1134 (1892); Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis.
313, 43 N.W. 1127 (1889); Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540, 18 N.W. 473 (1884).
52. Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 324 (1881).
53. 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
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it is malice against malice; the malice of the plaintiff preclud-
ing him from recovery for the malice of the defendant, pro-
voked by his own." 4 However, this is not the Wisconsin rule.
In Prindle v. Haight" the defendant was held not to be entitled
to balance against the deliberate malice of his act a malicious
course of conduct on the part of plaintiff. The defendant was
limited to showing such provocation on the part of plaintiff
(malicious or otherwise) as would show that he did not act with
deliberate malice. Thus provocation of the plaintiff is admissi-
ble not to mitigate the damages but to prove that there was no
malice on the part of the defendant. The defendant who acts
under provocation by the plaintiff is subject to exemplary dam-
ages if the provocation is too slight to account for his act and
also if there appears to have been the slightest degree of delib-
eration in his conduct no matter how great the provocation. If
the facts are that the defendant acted impulsively and with
sufficient provocation, it is a natural conclusion that he acted
without deliberate malice."
H. Function of Court and Jury
Before the question of the allowance of punitive damages in
a tort action can properly be submitted to the jury, the trial
court must first determine, as a matter of law, whether the
situation disclosed is within the field recognized by law as a
proper one for the allowance of punitive damages.5 In
Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co.,"5 the court, citing prior
decisions, stated:
It was there distinctively held that punitory damages are not
allowable as a matter of legal right; that in all cases the court
should decide whether, in any reasonable view of the evi-
dence, punitory damages would be proper and, if so, to then
instruct the jury what elements of fact are requisite to justify
such damages and make it plain that whether to allow them
or not is left to their sound discretion.59
54. Id. at 290.
55. 83 Wis. 50, 52 N.W. 1134 (1892).
56. Wickhern, supra note 42, at 145. See also Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Acc. &
Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913); Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 263
(1862).
57. Meshane v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 222 N.W. 320 (1928).
58. 143 Wis. 52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910).
59. Id. at 71, 126 N.W. at 561.
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Thus, the court determines from the evidence that the jury
could draw an inference of malice from the facts presented, and
then submits it to the jury for an award of such damages, in
their discretion. On the other hand, if the court determines
that no such inference can be drawn from a reasonable view of
the evidence then the issue is not to be submitted to the jury
and the award of punitive damages is not an issue. 0 In the
absence of such evidence the trial court is not to submit the
issue of punitive damages to the jury and if he does the su-
preme court will reverse. On the other hand, if the evidence
gives rise to a question of fact on the issue of malice the plain-
tiff has a right to have the issue of punitive damages submitted
to the jury.
The award of punitive damages in a particular case is en-
tirely within the discretion of the jury." It is error for the trial
judge to instruct the jury that they must or should award such
damages." The plaintiff has no right to an assessment of puni-
tive damages and any instruction placing such a duty on the
jury is erroneous. 3 In Tilton v. J.L. Gates Land Co.64 the court
stated:
Courts generally hold that punitory damages are not assessa-
ble as a matter of right, and this court has so held in Robinson
v. Superior R. T.R. Co., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961, where the
authorities on the point are reviewed. The question of the
allowance or disallowance of punitory damages is one for trial
courts and juries to pass upon, and this court will not reverse
a judgment for failure to award such damages, nor will it
undertake to make an assessment of the same. 5
An instruction that the plaintiff was "also entitled" to puni-
tives was held erroneous.6 An instruction that the jury was
"authorized" to award punitives, was held to be technically
correct but was criticized by the court as being misleading and
60. Id.
61. Asplund v. Palmer, 258 Wis. 34, 44 N.W.2d 624 (1950); Topolewski v. Plankin-
ton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910); Eggett v. Allen, 119 Wis. 625, 96
N.W. 803 (1903).
62. Lechren v. Ebenreiter, 235 Wis. 244, 292 N.W. 913 (1940); Topoleweki v. Plan-
kinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 126 N.W. 554 (1910).
63. Huggard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 158 Wis. 1, 147 N.W. 1020 (1914).
64. 140 Wis. 197, 121 N.W. 331 (1909).
65. Id. at 210, 121 N.W. at 336.
66. Robinson v. Superior Rapid Transit Ry., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896).
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not clearly pointing out the discretionary power of the jury. 7
Huggard v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway"5 exempli-
fies this discretionary power. The jury came in with a special
verdict which had a finding of malice, but no award of punitive
damages. The court held that there was no inconsistency in
such a verdict. The court will not reverse a jury determination
that punitives should not be awarded. In Haberman v. Gasser"5
the court held that the instruction to the jury that it was "their
privilege in this case" to give punitive damages was misleading
and erroneous. After instructing the jury as to what elements
of fact are requisite to justify punitives a proper instruction
would be phrased as follows:
Punitive damages are never a matter of right, but, when
allowable, may be awarded or withheld in the discretion of
the jury. Punitive damages may not be awarded unless the
acts of the defendant in question were done maliciously or in
willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, and, even
if malicious, willful or reckless, you may withhold or allow
punitive damages as you see fit.70
In Lisowski v. Chenenoffl1 the court held that the trial court
correctly instructed the jury that punitive damages are as-
sessed not to compensate the injured but as a punishment to
the tortfeasor and as a deterrent to others. 72
I. Remittitur and Additur
Despite the jury's broad discretion the court still retains
supervisory power over the amount of punitives to be awarded.
In Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc.73 the court ex-
tended application of the Powers rule to punitive awards. The
court stated:
In Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 78, 102
N.W. (2d) 393, we changed the rule of options as applied to
compensatory damages and allowed the trial court to deter-
mine what it thought to be a reasonable sum and to grant the
67. Eggett v. Allen, 119 Wis. 625, 96 N.W. 803 (1903).
68. 158 Wis. 1, 147 N.W. 1020 (1914).
69. 104 Wis. 98, 80 N.W. 105 (1899).
70. WIs. J.I. - CIVIL No. 1707.
71. 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
72. See also Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109
N.W.2d 516 (1961); Vieth v. Dorsch, 247 Wis. 17, 79 N.W.2d 96 (1956); Wis. J.I. - CIVIL
No. 1707.
73. 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).
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plaintiff the option to accept it or have a new trial. It seems
to us that once the jury has decided in its discretion to award
punitive damages, the amount thereof must be subject to the
control of the court. True, the jury need not award any puni-
tive damages, but having done so, the amount thereof should
be subject to the court's revision in the same manner as com-
pensatory damages. It is not logical to say excessive punitive
damages cannot be reduced by the court to a reasonable
amount because the jury had the power to deny any amount.
In such cases, the fact is the jury exercised its discretion and
made an excessive award of punitive damages. We held that
the Powers rule extends to punitive damages and a trial court
has the power to reduce the amount of punitive damages to
what it determines is a fair and reasonable amount for such
kind of damages. 74
However, where the verdict is so clearly excessive as to indicate
that it is the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption, or it is
clear that the jury disregarded the evidence, the Powers rule is
inapplicable and the trial court should set aside the entire
verdict rather than attempt to cure it by invoking the Powers
rule.75
The trial court's award of punitive damages is subject to
review on appeal by the supreme court. The trial court's deter-
mination will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse
of discretion or where the verdict is so clearly excessive as to
indicate passion and prejudice. 76 A party who has exercised an
option to accept a reduced award, remitting the excess to avoid
a new trial may have a review on appeal without waiving the
benefits of his acceptance if the opposing party appeals the
judgment.77
The trial court can not exercise additur, in view of the prop-
osition that the determination of whether punitives are to be
awarded, as well as the amount thereof, is solely within the
discretion of the jury. Therefore, no amount awarded could be
unreasonably low. The plaintiff cannot complain if the jury
fails to award such damages or awards an inadequate amount
since in theory he has been fully compensated for his injuries
74. Id. at 65, 109 N.W.2d at 521.
75. Meke v. Nicol, 56 Wis. 2d 654, 203 N.W.2d 129 (1973).
76. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965); Fuchs v. Kupper, 22
Wis. 2d 107, 125 N.W.2d 360 (1963).
77. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971).
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and punitive damages are over and above such compensation.
Even though the evidence would sustain an award of punitive
damages, it is not error if the jury fails to award them.7 8
II. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS AFFECTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Actual Damages Necessary to Sustain an Award
Wisconsin follows the general rule that a claim for punitive
damages alone is insufficient as a basis for a cause of action,
and that in order to justify the recovery of punitive damages
there must be a showing of actual injury which would justify
an award of actual or compensatory damages. In Maxwell v.
Kennedy" the court quoted from Stacey v. Portland Publishing
Co."0 as follows:
There is no room for punitive damages here. There is no
foundation for them to attach or rest upon. It is said, in
vindication of the theory of punitive damages, that the inter-
ests of the individual injured and society are blended. Here
the interests of society have virtually nothing to blend with.
If the individual has but a nominal interest, society can have
none. Such damages are to be awarded against a defendant
for punishment. But, if all of individual injury is merely tech-
nical and theoretical, what is the punishment to be inflicted
for? If a plaintiff, upon all such elements of injury as were
open to him, is entitled to recover but nominal damages, shall
he be the recipient of penalties awarded on account of an
injury, or supposed injury, to others beside himself? Punitive
damages are the last to be assessed in the elements to be
considered by a jury, and should be the first to be rejected
by facts in mitigation.8'
The decision also points out that nominal damages are not a
sufficient basis for a punitive damage award. 2
In Hanson v. Valdiva,83 plaintiff's decedent had committed
suicide after the defendant had alienated the affections of his
wife. The plaintiff, as special administrator of decedent's es-
78. Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516
(1961).
79. 50 Wis. 645, 7 N.W. 657 (1880).
80. 68 Me. 279 (1878).
81. 50 Wis. at 648, 7 N.W. at 658.
82. See also Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971); Widem-
shek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W.2d 275 (1962); Barnard v. Cohen, 165 Wis. 417,
162 N.W. 480 (1917).
83. 51 Wis. 2e 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971).
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tate, commenced an action to recover both compensatory and
punitive damages. The court held that a cause of action for
damages for loss of services or consortium did not survive the
decedent under Wisconsin's survival statute. Since there must
be a showing of some actual injury which would justify an
award of compensatory damages before punitive damages may
be awarded, plaintiff's cause of action for punitive damages
was dismissed.
An interesting issue was raised in Gatzow v. Buening,4 in
which an action was brought to recover for humiliation and
mental distress as a result of the willful conduct of the defen-
dant in denying the plaintiff the use of a hearse at the funeral
of the plaintiff's four-year-old son. Under the then existing
rule, damages for mental suffering were not recoverable in the
absence of physical injury. Today, in order to recover damages
for mental distress the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suf-
fered an extreme disabling emotional response to the defend-
ant's conduct. 5 The Gatzow case incolved mental suffering,
but not of sufficient degree to allow damages under Alsteen
v. Gehl.--' The issue could be raised that if there is mental
suffering, but this is not recoverable because it is not part of
another cause of action, such as assault and battery, should-
n't punitive damages be allowed? Mental suffering, if proven,
could be actual harm. However, it would appear from the
Gatzow, Alsteen and Maxwell cases that such suffering, in the
absence of circumstances entailing a judgment of compensa-
tory damage, could not be the basis for an award of punitives.
In Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway 6 plaintiff
sued for insulting, violent and abusive acts resulting when the
defendant's conductor kissed her against her will. Testimony
indicated that she was not actually injured but the court stated
that "in actions for personal tort, mental suffering, vexation
and anxiety are subject to compensation in damages." The
court indicated that if malice was proven exemplary damages
could be added to the compensatory damages.
B. Wealth of Defendant
The only form of an exemplary damage award is money
84. 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
85. Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
85.1. Id.
86. 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
damages, therefore the wealth of the defendant will have an
important bearing on the amount that will properly punish and
deter him. An award that will punish a poor man may have
little effect on a man of great wealth. For this reason evidence
of the wealth of the defendant is admissible."7
The defendant's wealth for the purpose of determining pu-
nitive damages need not be determined exactly as of the day
of trial and needs only to be reasonably accurate." In Jones v.
Fisher9 the court held that a defendant's earnings and finan-
cial resources as well as his net worth are admissible as an aid
to the jury in fixing punitive damages. This evidence may also
be introduced by showing the defendant's "reputed wealth.""0
The plaintiff is not required to go into any details as to the
exact property of the defendant but the defendant may intro-
duce evidence of his limited financial resources, even though
no attempt has been made to show that he is a person of
wealth.
In Ogodziski v. Gara9' the court held that an instruction to
the jury that the amount of punitives "is governed by the
wealth of the party" was erroneous. The defendant's wealth is
only a circumstance to be considered in assessing punitives. In
theory, this rule is correct as to punitive damages, but in prac-
tice it might tend to, and often does, unduly prejudice the jury
upon the merits of the case and the amount of compensatory
damages. 2
The chief difficulty in applying the rule as to proof of wealth
has been in the case of a joint tort where there are two or more
defendants. Although punitive damages may be awarded
where there is one judgment against several tortfeasors, the
court has held that evidence of the wealth of one defendant is
prejudicial to the rights of the other, since both defendants are
87. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971); Fuchs v. Kupper,
22 Wis. 2d 107, 125 N.W.2d 360 (1963); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc.,
14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961); Lehner v. Berlin Publishing Co., 211 Wis. 119,
246 N.W. 579 (1933); Ogodziski v. Gara, 173 Wis. 380, 181 N.W. 231 (1921); Draper v.
Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884); and Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300 (1875).
88. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971).
89. 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
90. Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
91. 173 Wis. 380, 181 N.W. 231 (1921).
92. Wickhem, supra note 42, at 155.
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jointly and severally liable the poorer defendant will be un-
justly injured, because of the wealth of his co-defendant.13
C. Prior Actions
The question often arises as to the effect of a prior action
resulting in tort liability on the part of the defendant for the
same conduct. In Luther v. Shaw4 a parent sued for his dam-
ages as a result of the wrongful seduction of his daughter. Puni-
tive damages were allowed the parent and the court stated that
the mere fact that the daughter had also brought an action
against the defendant in which she was allowed punitives
would not prevent recovery or reduce the amount of punitives
recoverable by the father. A similar question arises as to the
effect of a criminal suit or potential criminal liability against
the defendant. In Klopfer v. Bromme9 5 the court held that the
mere possibility that the defendant might be prosecuted crimi-
nally was not a matter which the jury was to consider for the
purpose of reducing exemplary damages.
D. Intoxication
In Schmidt v. Pfeil9" the defendant requested an instruction
that since he was intoxicated at the time of the act this should
be considered by the jury in reducing the amount of punitive
recovery. The trial court instructed the jury that the intoxica-
tion of the defendant was not a mitigating circumstance to be
taken into consideration. The supreme court stated that since
there was no evidence to show that the defendant was in such
a state of intoxication so as to be deprived of his reason, "or
irresponsible for his acts," his condition would not mitigate the
result. The issue raised is similar to the statutory defense of
intoxication in a criminal case. 7 In State v. Guiden" the court
stated that in order to be relieved from responsibility for crimi-
nal acts the defendant must establish that degree of intoxica-
tion that means he was utterly incapable of forming the intent
necessary for the crime charged. Adapting the court's holding
93. Meke v. Nicol, 56 Wis. 2d 654, 203 N.W.2d 129 (1973); McAllister v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 169 Wis. 473, 173 N.W. 216 (1919).
94. 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914).
95. 26 Wis. 372 (1870).
96. 24 Wis. 452 (1869).
97. Wis. STAT. § 939.42 (1973).
98. 46 Wis. 2d 328, 174 N.W.2d 488 (1970).
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to the issue in Schmidt it appears that unless the defendant is
deprived of his reason or becomes irresponsible for his acts, as
a result of intoxication, this fact is not to be considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
E. Reputation
In actions to recover for injury to reputation, such as slan-
der or libel, the bad reputation of the plaintiff is a mitigating
factor as to actual damages. The same rule is applicable to
punitive damages in such cases. In Maxwell v. Kennedy99 the
court stated that "no distinction should be made in the class
of damages, whether compensatory or punitory, as the subject
of mitigation by proof of bad reputation." ' If the defendant
can prove that the plaintiff's reputation is so bad that the
wrongful acts of the defendant were not likely to injure him in
any degree, or in any great degree, this may be taken into
consideration in mitigation of damages, actual or punitive. 01
F. Must Punitives Be Proportionate to the Compensatory?
Although early Wisconsin decisions indicated that punitive
damages must be proportionate to compensatory damages, it
is doubtful that this is now the rule in Wisconsin. In Malco,
Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc. 102 the rule was limited
to cases involving injury to reputation, such as slander, libel,
or malicious prosecution. In the recent libel case of Calero v.
Del Chemical Corp.,0 3 the court reviewed the various stan-
dards previously set forth by the court for reviewing the reason-
ableness of punitive damage awards. The court stated:
This court has stated that punitive damages "... should be
proportionate with compensatory damages ... " Wozniak
v. Local 1111 of the UE (1973), 57 Wis. 2d 725, 731, 205
N.W.2d 369. In the present case the awards were $10,000
compensatory damages with $9,000 punitive damages. This
court has also stated: "There is no arbitrary rule that puni-
tive damages cannot equal 15 times the compensatory dam-
ages." Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales (1961), 14 Wis. 2d
57, 66, 109 N.W.2d 516. This court has also said that it is
99. 50 Wis. 645, 7 N.W. 657 (1880).
100. Id. at 648, 7 N.W. at 658.
101. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139
N.W. 386 (1913).
102. 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).
103. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
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relevant to consider the maximum fine in the Criminal Code
governing similar offenses. Wozniak, page 731; Meke v. Nicol
(1973), 56 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 203 N.W.2d 129. The maximum
fine for defamation under sec. 942.01, Stats., is $1,000. The
award here is nine times that. In Meke this court considered
an award of punitive damages 13 times the maximum fine for
a similar offense as but one element in its decision to set aside
the verdict. But in Dalton v. Meister, supra, page 181, this
court upheld an award of $75,000 in punitive damages in a
libel case where the maximum fine was as it is here, $1,000,
stating ". . . this court has set no arbitrary maximum" on
punitive damage awards.04
In Dalton v. Meister, 05 another libel case, the court stated that
there is no arithmetic proportion to which punitive damages
should relate to the damage done the plaintiff.
In light of the Calero and Dalton decisions, the proportion-
ate rule for punitive damages is not an absolute standard, but
rather one factor in determining the reasonableness of the pu-
nitive damage award. Other factors to be considered include:
the wealth of the defendant, the triviality of defendant's act,
the degree of malicious intention, potential damage which
might have been done, the maximum criminal fine for similar
conduct, and the purposes for which punitive damages are
awarded - to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from
like conduct.
III. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Permissible Punitive Damages
Ordinarily, the principal is not liable for exemplary dam-
ages as a result of the malicious conduct of an employee, agent
or servant. The reason is that although the act may be commit-
ted within the scope of the employee's employment and for the
benefit of the principal, ordinarily the principal does not par-
ticipate in the malicious motive of the employee. 6 Although
the act is done within the scope of employment so as to render
the principal liable for the actual damage suffered, such an act,
104. Id. at 510-11, 228 N.W.2d at 750. In Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 243
N.W.2d 508 (1976), the court compared the maximum criminal fine for adultery,
$1,000, with the punitive damage award of $10,000 and held that the award was clearly
excessive in light of the facts.
105. 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
106. Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1857).
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if done with a malicious motive does not in and of itself render
the principal liable for punitive damages.0 7
The purpose of an exemplary damage award is to punish
and deter the offender; therefore, it would seem that such may
be awarded only against a person who in some way has partici-
pated in the commission of the malicious act. Thus, a principal
may be held liable in punitive damages for the concededly
malicious tort of his agent only when he has either authorized,
ratified or conspired in the malicious conduct of his employee
or agent.' 8 Authorization or conspiracy cases are rare. Gatzow
v. Buening'9 may be a factual example of conspiracy or author-
ization. In that case, the defendant either requested the mali-
cious act to be performed or ratified the request by another
person. Moreover, it appears that the defendants had in fact
conspired to cause the harm. Of course, a corporation is liable
in exemplary damages for its own malicious act, that is to say,
for the act of its directors or other agents whose act is the act
of the corporation. The Restatement of Agency states the rule
as follows:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master
or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only
if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in
employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal rati-
fied or approved the act."'0
In Garcia v. Samson's Inc."' it was held that no recovery
could be had for punitive damages from the employer in the
absence of proof that the employer authorized or ratified the
alleged tortious act. Ratification is a fact to be determined by
the jury, and where the jury was not asked to pass upon the
107. Vassau v. Madison Elec. Ry., 106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W. 152 (1900); Milwaukee
& Miss. R.R. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 330 (1860).
108. Robinson v. Superior Rapid Transit Ry., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896);
Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1857).
109. 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957).
111. 10 Wis. 2d 515, 103 N.W.2d 565 (1960).
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question nor instructed with reference to the ratification, the
trial court was justified in granting a motion for a new trial.
B. Proof of Ratification
The majority of cases in this field involve the problem of
ratification. Retention of the agent after the principal has
knowledge of the malicious conduct is evidence of ratification.
"[R]esponsibility for exemplary damages in cases of ratifica-
tion will be an admonition for the prompt dismissal of offend-
ing officers, as their retention might well be held evidence of
ratification."11 2 The evidentiary weight of retention may be
diminished by the peculiar set of facts involved. In Vassau v.
Madison Electric Railway"3 the court found that the agent had
not acted maliciously but the opinion indicated that, since the
agent was one of the principal's oldest employees, having
worked for him for twenty years, retention would not be ratifi-
cation as a matter of law. "Mere failure to dismiss a servant,
unaccompanied by conduct indicating approval of the wrongful
conduct, is not a sufficient basis on which to impose punitive
damages."" 4
Ratification requires knowledge of the fact or act to be rati-
fied on the part of the principal."' The question of what consti-
tutes notice or knowledge necessary to amount to ratification
has been involved in several cases. In Robinson v. Superior
Rapid Transit Railway"' the trial court held, as a matter of
law, that the principal had knowledge, the only evidence
thereof being the facts alleged in the complaint as served on the
defendant. The supreme court reversed on the ground that the
defendant is not conclusively bound to know of the malice,
merely because it was so alleged in the complaint. However,
Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,"7 decided twenty
years before the Robinson decision, indicated that the contents
of the complaint are to be considered as a factor in notifying
the principal of his agent's conduct.
The knowledge of the malicious agent apparently does not
112. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 667 (1877).
113. 106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W. 152 (1900).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C, comment b (1957).
115. Mid-Continent Refrigeration Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 178 N.W.2d 28
(1970).
116. 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896).
117. 42 Wis. 654 (1877).
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constitute notice to the principal. The reason for this is, pre-
sumably, that the agent has no duty to disclose such informa-
tion to his principal, or that no knowledge can be imputed to
the principal where the agent is engaged in conduct adverse to
the interests of his principal. Perhaps, the latter ground is the
one implicitly used by the courts. In the Bass case," '8 the court
held that notice of a brakeman's malicious conduct on the part
of the conductor was notice to the corporation, although the
conductor never communicated the fact to higher corporate
officers. This would indicate that if a supervising agent learns
of facts relative to a subordinate employee or agent this be-
comes the knowledge of the corporation, since knowledge of
such conduct is not adverse to the interest of the principal. On
the other hand, where the conductor is the malicious agent
himself, the court has failed to find an imputation of knowl-
edge, for then the conductor is engaged in conduct adverse to
the interests of the principal."9 The same result was achieved
in Mace v. Reed'20 where the defendant was the owner of a boat
on which the plaintiff was injured when the captain thereof,
with apparent malice, committed a battery on the person of the
plaintiff.
The purposes of the doctrine of imputed liability for com-
pensatory damages is to deter the employer from employing
vicious, incompetent or negligent employees. This liability
should be a sufficient deterrent without having to impose puni-
tive damages upon an employer who has been entirely innocent
of any malice. Any other result would be unduly harsh.
IV. SUMMARY
The foregoing analysis involves situations where punitive
damages are allowed in civil suits under the common law. Gen-
erally, punitive damages will be awarded where the harm was
inflicted under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty,
with vindictiveness or malice, or where the defendant acted in
wanton, wilful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
Another situation in which punitives may be awarded is where
118. Id.
119. Huggard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 158 Wis. 1, 147 N.W. 1020 (1914);
Vassau v. Madison Elec. Ry., 106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W. 152 (1900); Robinson v. Superior
Rapid Transit Ry., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896); Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. v.
Finney, 10 Wis. 330 (1860).
120. 89 Wis. 440, 62 N.W. 186 (1895).
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either Congress or the state legislature has provided for puni-
tive damages by statute. The statutory provisions are of two
categories: (1) those expressly providing for punitive dam-
ages;' 2 ' and (2) those providing for either double or treble dam-
ages. 122 The large number of state and federal laws providing
for punitive damages in the two categories preclude a compre-
hensive listing in this article. Counsel is well advised to check
the statutory law on a case by case basis.
In most instances the conditions under which statutory
punitive, double, or treble damages are allowable are less strin-
gent than the common law requirements of malice or vindic-
tiveness. Ordinarily, all that counsel has to prove is the viola-
tion of the statute to establish a prima facie case. For example,
Wisconsin Statutes section 706.06(4) concerning authentica-
tion of property documents provides:
(4) In addition to any criminal penalty or civil remedy oth-
erwise provided by law, knowingly false authentication of an
instrument shall subject the authenticator to liability in tort
for compensatory and punitive damages caused thereby to
any person.'1
A "knowingly false authentication" would give rise to a cause
of action for punitive damages.
In John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke'21 the court considered
whether the plaintiff was entitled to both common law punitive
and statutory treble damages in an antitrust case.'2 The court
stated that a statute creating a cause of action for treble dam-
ages was punitive in nature, and that when a statute creates a
cause of action and provides a remedy, the remedy is exclusive.
The court also held that allowing both common law punitive
damages and treble damages which did not require proof of
wilful or malicious intent represented a double recovery of a
penalty and thus violated the "basic fairness of a judicial pro-
121. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 425.301(1) (1973) (Wisconsin Consumer Code); Wis. STAT.
§ 706.06(4) (1973) (deeds, false authentication); Wis. STAT. § 968.31(d) (1973) (misuse
of wiretaps).
122. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 174.03 (1973) (dog bite, double damages); Wis. STAT. §
174.04 (1973) (dog bite, treble damages); Wis. STAT. § 133.01(1) (1973) (monopolies and
unfair trade - treble damages).
123. Wis. STAT. § 706.06(4) (1973).
124. 55 Wis. 2d 402, 198 N.W.2d 363 (1972).
125. Wis. STAT. § 133.01(1) (1973).
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ceeding required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." 2 '
In certain actions the legislature has specifically prohibited
any award of punitive damages as in tort actions against politi-
cal corporations,'2 state officers or state employees. 2 1
The law of punitive damages continues to expand both by
court decision and legislative enactment. The courts of Wiscon-
sin have demonstrated a cautious approach, giving due consid-
eration to the interests of both the plaintiff and defendant.
This has resulted in an orderly development of the law which
will be quite helpful when lawyers are asked to advise clients
as to their rights in the future.
126. 55 Wis. 2d at 409, 198 N.W.2d at 367.
127. WIs. STAT. § 895.43(2) (1973).
128. Wis. STAT. § 895.45(4) (1973). See also Wis. STAT. § 895.02 (1973) (punitive
damages not allowed in a survival action).
